– Atty. A. Teage Jalloh
A. Teage Jalloh, Esq., [email protected], Contributing Writer
Some constitutional provisions are ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations. One provision that is not ambiguous, however, is Article 28 of the 1986 Liberian Constitution which states, in relevant part, that “Any person, at least one of whose parents was a citizen of Liberia at the time of the person’s birth, shall be a citizen of Liberia; provided that any such person shall upon reaching maturity renounce any other citizenship acquired by virtue of one parent being a citizen of another country.”
Notwithstanding this clear and straightforward language, particularly its narrowed renunciation clause, some have sought to expand it to other Liberians. Their argument misconstrues Article 28, as both the text of the 1986 Constitution and its draft show the following: (i) The Constitution recognizes a limited form of dual citizenship for a Liberian who acquires another citizenship by reason of his or her non-Liberian parent being a citizen of that country; (ii) The framers of the Constitution considered but rejected language that would have expanded Article 28’s renunciation clause to a Liberian who acquires the citizenship of another country by virtue of being born in that country; and (iii) because the Constitution provides for a government of enumerated powers, one cannot imagine something that is not in our written Constitution simply to take away or deny a right or privilege that he or she might not like.
We begin by noting that our present Constitution came into force on January 6, 1986, and that in recognition of persons who were already Liberian citizens prior to January 6, 1986, Article 27(a) of the Constitution states: “All persons who, on the coming into force of this Constitution were lawfully citizens of Liberia shall continue to be Liberian citizens.” We will later return to Article 27(a) to show why this group of citizens are unaffected by Article 28’s narrowed renunciation clause.
Moving to Article 28, its first clause declares: “Any person, at least one of whose parents was a citizen of Liberia at the time of the person’s birth, shall be a citizen of Liberia.” This language is clear: A person born anywhere in the world to at least one Liberian parent is a Liberian by birth. Moreover, because Article 27(a) already covers the citizenship of persons who were Liberian citizens prior to the coming into force of the 1986 Constitution, we can reasonably conclude that Article 28’s citizenship clause only applies to Liberians born on or after January 6, 1986, and that any prohibition therein will have to be applied forward as in keeping with the 1986 Constitution which further states in Article 21 that no “person shall be made subject to any law or punishment which was not in effect at the time of commission of an offense.”
If no Liberian can be made subject to any law or punishment that was not in effect at the time he or she acquired a foreign citizenship, especially Liberians whose citizenship are covered by Article 27(a), can those who seek to expand Article 28’s renunciation language honestly say that such Liberians are not enjoying dual citizenship by default? If such right is being enjoyed, why seek to deny others from enjoying it?
The second clause of Article 28, connected to the first clause by a semicolon, states as follows: “provided that any such person shall upon reaching maturity renounce any other citizenship acquired by virtue of one parent being a citizen of another country.”
Assuming, for argument’s sake, that Article 28’s narrowed condition could be ignored in pursue of the “spirit” argument, we herein offer evidence from the draft copy of the 1986 Constitution which proves that the constitution’s framers intended for Article 28’s condition to apply only to Liberians who acquired another citizenship “by virtue of one parent being a citizen of another country.”
We gather several things from this textual language: First, the words “any such person” informs that its application is restricted to Liberians referenced in the first clause; that is, persons who acquired Liberian citizenship at birth on or after January 6, 1986. Second, the language is clear that the Republic recognizes dual citizenship for “such person” up to the age of maturity. Third, the condition that “such person” must at the age of maturity renounce “any other citizenship acquired by virtue of one parent being a citizen of another country” clearly does not apply to any person born unto two parents who only hold Liberian citizenship; neither does it apply to a Liberian who acquires another citizenship by virtue of having being born in that country.
When a constitutional provision is clear — as we conclude Article 28 is — the provision’s letter cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its “spirit”. Moreover, because ours is a government of enumerated powers, we infer when necessary to preserve or expand rights. We do not add words to a constitutional provision simply to take away rights.
Additionally, the rule of constitutional interpretation is too settled to be denied: When construing a “constitution provision, resort may be had to the maxim that the expression of one thing in a constitution may necessarily involve the exclusion of other things not expressed.” Thus, when a constitutional provision states a single expression (as only requiring a Liberian at maturity to renounce a citizenship acquired by virtue of one parent being a citizen of that country), a court may not say that other limitations were intended though not mentioned; for to do so will destroy the principle of notice and the very purpose of having a written constitution.
Assuming, for argument’s sake, that Article 28’s narrowed condition could be ignored in pursue of the “spirit” argument, we herein offer evidence from the draft copy of the 1986 Constitution which proves that the constitution’s framers intended for Article 28’s condition to apply only to Liberians who acquired another citizenship “by virtue of one parent being a citizen of another country.”
The draft Constitution, which the National Constitution Committee submitted for subsequent consideration by the Constitutional Advisory Committee that was charged with revising the draft, contains the following proposed language under article 28:
“Any person, at least one of whose parents was at the time of the person’s birth a citizen of Liberia, shall be a citizen of Liberia; provided that where such person shall have acquired the citizenship of another country by virtue of having been born in that country or by virtue of one parent being a citizen of another country, that person must, upon attaining the age of eighteen years, renounce any other citizenship so acquired.” For reliance, see: the 1983 draft to the 1986 Constitution.
Now compare the draft language with the revised language approved by Constitutional Advisory Committee: “Any person, at least one of whose parents was a citizen of Liberia at the time of the person’s birth, shall be a citizen of Liberia; provided that any such person shall upon reaching maturity renounce any other citizenship acquired by virtue of one parent being a citizen of another country.”
Comparing the rejected language with the present language of Article 28, it is clear that the proposed language that would have required a Liberian to renounce a citizenship acquired “by virtue of having been born in that country” was intentionally rejected by the Constitutional Advisory Committee and, as such, neither the text nor the “spirit” of Article 28 can be used to prohibit the referenced group of Liberians from enjoying their foreign citizenship along with their Liberian citizenship. We submit that there are Liberians who by birth hold the citizenship of the U.S. and other countries.
With such irrefutable evidence that the framers rejected a blanket prohibition on dual citizenship and purposefully provided for certain Liberians to enjoy dual citizenship, coupled with the fact that Article 28’s narrowed prohibition cannot be retroactively applied to Liberians under Article 27(a), can anybody still argue that the 1986 Constitution, in its present form, prohibits all Liberians from dual citizenship? If the answer is “no”, have we been in search of a solution to a “problem” that does not exist?
