The Editor,

In pursuit of regional integrated security and defense, ECOWAS in partnership with the United States government announced the establishment of Regional Security framework which stipulates that Member States undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

To this effect, the Government of the Republic of Liberia, like other member states, issued Executive Order Number 76 in July 2016 to establish the National Centre for the Coordination of Early Response Mechanism (NCCERM) consistent with Article 58 (F) of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty (1993) on Regional Security.

In furtherance of the implementation of the regulations of the NCCERM as adopted by the Authority of Head of State and Government, the NCCERM is to be situated within the offices of the Vice President of Liberia with other agencies constituting its statutory Board for the purpose of effective and efficient oversight.

Security safeguard is not new, but its practice and the manner in which states and organisations respond are constantly changing with time, innovation and technological capacity.

This revised mandate should give a renewed impetus to assigning not just a dedicated role to the structures residing in member states, but resources that will first ripen manpower, logistics and technological advancement requires running a contemporary integrated security system towards achieving desire objectives of the program.

For this region, research, investigation, military, Police operations and policymaking have produced a new understanding of the security threat with specific focus on terrorism/violent extremism and poverty across fragile states.

These two have undermined the nature of the international security programs and deliverables.

Undeniably, NCCERM appears to be a good mechanism to combat terrorism and violent extremism.

The continuous threat of terrorism and violent extremism in the region, as well as the growing capacity of terrorist organizations to fund their operations through criminal activities remains a challenge to our regional security strategy.

In order to respond to these developments, ECOWAS sub-committee in member states need to stress the need to activate its sub-sections on counter-terrorism with trained man power and an up to date counter terrorism research center, and to operationalize the ECOWAS special Fund on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.

This will help member states, especially fragile states renew support to internal intelligence networks that appear to be unsophisticated for variance reasons, and procure modern logistics for effective gathering of information and processing which will result into outcomes that benefit member states and the region as a whole.

Emmanuel David Togba,
emantogba1984@gmail.com

Over the last decades, self-radicalization has been one of the successful tools used by home grown extremists to negatively impact human existent. 

This form of terrorism is a process by which an individual, or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of the nation.

Academic researchers have argued over the years, but it still remains that the concept lacks a generally acceptable definition (Golder and Williams 2004).

Notwithstanding, Bjorgo (2005) consider it as an age long phenomenon that continues to wreck its havoc with strong, fragile and failed state.

Self-radicalization happens when one gets involved with self-teaching of extreme beliefs which may likely influence their thoughts about how to effectively respond.

Self-radicalization across the world is encouraged by entrenched unresolved political, economic issues like horrible poverty, uneven justice, religious issues and others. Many security and terrorism research professionals have linked radicalization to entrenched religious acceptance.

To these scholarly submissions, the most important conclusions of radicalization might be a misnomer.

According to a team of 17 researchers that collected testimony from 76 young people who have been involved with Malian ‘jihadist’ groups AQIM [al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], Katiba Macina, MUJWA [Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa], etc. – rarely met radicalized youth, in the sense that their participation in such groups was as a result of religious indoctrination.

This finding led to a team of Institute for Security Study researchers conducting a research project which concluded that it was more appropriate to seek understanding of youth’s association with violent extremist groups and self-radicalization instead of assuming an alleged ‘religious extremism’ as a lone factor. Contrarily to the first submission, many don’t join primarily for religious reasons or money.

They identified more than 16 categories of factors leading to youth involvement in radicalism and violent extremism.

Some of the factors are linked to a need for protection (of oneself, one’s family or community) or to economic reasons, including the need to protect an income-generating activity (cattle herding, drug trafficking, etc.).

There are also individual, psychological, historical and political reasons. Others are linked to coercion or the environment.

The report summarizes these findings in a titled ‘Mali’s young jihadists: fuelled by faith or circumstance?’.

The results of this project challenge preconceived ideas about the reasons why young people join extremist groups.

The case of Liberia and other countries with low profile of extremism and self-radicalization, the appropriate need for preventive machinery remains imperative.

Judging from Liberia’s past and with current reports pointing to high level of fragility, we should be concerned.

According to the catholic Relief Service survey (CRS) report, Liberia’s peace is tentative, fragile and volatile. Key findings in the CRS report point to where respondents were evenly split on whether Liberia is at risk of once again descending into large-scale violent conflict (50.6% for “high to very high risk” and 43.7% for “no to low risk”).

On reconciliation, more than 80% of the respondents felt that people who suffered grave injury during the war did not receive justice through the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

Half of the respondents (49.7%) believed that post-war reconciliation failed to achieve its objectives.

Youth unemployment is one of those the report qualified poorly, declaring that youth unemployed is 58.2%, topping the list of those who could instigate violence.

The report further submitted that Nimba, Grand Gedeh, and Montserrado were cited by respondents as the counties most likely to spark conflict, due to both historical and current factors.

Inhabitants of Rivercess (79.3%), Nimba (74.9%); Grand Kru (74.4%); and Grand Cape Mount (74.2%) assessed the risk as highest, while respondents in River Gee were the most optimistic.

These issues remain of concern to Liberians and our international partners, judging that they inform individual or group approach to seeking solution.

One can clearly say that Liberia, just like other countries aiding global efforts to create an “extremists free” world, must act now through programs and interventions that seek to make radicalization an unattractive option to seeking redress. 

It can be noted by available records, to mention few- Great Britain (Westminster attack, London bridge), Egypt (Catholic church palm Sunday attack), Paris (Nice attack), United States (2016 Orlando nightclub attack), Nigeria, Somalia and others, that radicalization is becoming a widely accepted approach for speaking out and revenge against a set of people, idea or nation.

Is there sufficient recognition of these root causes in our case? Not only are there multiple factors and dynamics but they usually also overlap and vary from one person, group, locality, degree and time to another.

Moreover, the reasons why an individual joins a group are not necessarily the same as those that make them decide to remain in or leave.

There are needs to do a more complex understanding of the multiplicity of factors that underlie youth involvement, instead of labeling all of them as religious fanatics.

Not just a theoretical understanding, but an understanding that informs policymaking, impacts strategy development and feeds into programme design.

For Liberia, our initial findings point to already existing programs piloted formally and informally by hatai shops, peace building networks, radio talk shows and social media groups by encouraging open discussions of issues affecting individuals, groups and the state in general in a way that helps reduce tension, hatred, clear misconceptions and reduce mainly the ‘anger storage’ of many young person.

However, it appears that these messages are not coin/structure to specifically discourage self-radicalization and mind manipulation.

First and foremost, scrutinizing how multiple factors lead to one becoming radicalized and conduct terrorist acts is very important and represents a new procedure that informs counter radicalization preventive measures.

This includes the incorporation of a mix of political, social and psychological insights in forging a mechanism that seeks create, promote high standard intellectual platforms to address wide-range of concerns/issues affecting youths across the country.

These discourses will touch on multidisciplinary model of radicalization, counter-radicalization and de-radicalization, focusing on how we can make radicalization unattractive.

While there are legitimate apprehensions about the need to take serious action in heightening Liberia’s counter terrorism approaches, it remains a fact that prevention is the first mast of enterprising security architecture now in the world, which we must shadow.

There is a growing inclination to every old security structure that security heads towards detection and respond mechanism, but with prevention, damages are not incur, making it the wiser approach for security and peace.

Very few places then, ‘prevention’ at the core of their security strategy, however prevention focused security framework is gaining prominence in recent times, which Liberia must benefit from.

Budget constraints and shortage of skilled manpower are compelling countries to bring maximum value out of deployments, and hence, a prevention first approach, can enable them to build robust security policies and address the issue of cost, talent, and experts.

Emmanuel David Togba, Contributing Writer
emantogba1984@gmail.com

The Editor,

I have followed the Armed Forces of Liberia’s demand for government to make available additional money in appending their disbandment packages. 

By these concerns and with serious interest, I was emboldened to analyze the program with specific prominence on the AFL disbandment component which was called for in the Accra Peace Accords.

Recently, the Minster of National Defense Brownie Samukai asserted that the government has spent close to 20 Million toward the process of paying arrears to the disbanded members of the armed forces of Liberia in an apparent response to the demand of the disbanded men.

This attracted my attention as student of Post conflict Military reconstruction.

Considerably, I have come to realized that neither the government nor the AFL can be held accountable for the irregularities referenced in this case since United Nations Mission in Liberia and other partners were leading the security sector reform and the implementation of provisions towards Liberia Peace and Security in the CPA.

First and foremost, I have come not to offer support to the specific claims of members of the disbanded forces neither to agree that the government owe nothing in arrears for them as they claimed but to inject the missing link.

The process of disbandment comes in several forms and for different reasons as the crafters may deem necessary based on an informed feasibility assessment.

Liberia case was similar to others, even though resource constraints thwarted most of the required standard; key among them was an assessment result that would have informed a procedure that best suit the specific case of the disbanded personnel of the Armed Forces of Liberia.

Key issues this assessment would have attended to, includes unveiling the managerial capability of the personnel beyond their service in the army and evaluation on their mental capability to adjust to new skills and careers for a sustainable future.

In this case, one would assume that the process which targeted at delivering cash package to the disbanded AFL personnel was not properly appraised to complement their degree of venerability and after service options to livelihood.

Therefore, I herein advocate that the specific claim of the AFL may not be as valid as they appealed but the omission of the code component in the SSRR towards their disbandment aborted the essence.

To this grave negligence, I suggest that UNMIL and other Para status be held liable and if need be facilitate a process that seeks to complete the circle of their disbandment and satisfactorily empower the disbanded members.

Emmanuel David Togba,
MA-Terrorism, International Crimes and Global Security (Honor)
emantogba1984@gmail.com | 886451886 – 777212636